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'S
ANOVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY
PATTERNS
1. The Use of Budgetary Policy
In summarizing and evaluating the findings on the policy responses of
individual countries to their balance-of-payments disturbances, which
are presented in detail in the next part, it may be convenient to start
by the examination of budgetary policy, which offers quite clear—
though negative—conclusions.
In country after country, it has been repeatedly found that budgetary
policy throughout the period under investigation was not responsive
to the requirements of the balance of payments. There is no single
country out of the nine covered in this study in which a positive, con-
sistent pattern of response is revealed. Even individual episodes in
which budgetary policy might be interpreted as having been taken in
reaction to the needs of the balance of payments are not very frequent.
This may be seen from Table 2-1, which repeats in a summary form
the observations brought out in the respective country analyses.
As Table 2-1 indicates, the only instance over any considerable
length of time in which budgetary policy behaved in a manner which
may be interpreted as a response to the balance-of-payments position
is that of the United Kingdom from late 1952 to late 1956. All other
episodes seem to be sporadic. The evidence is, it should be mentioned,
based very often on deficient data or on data which pertain to only
a part of the period under consideration. Likewise, the qualifications
which must be attached to the interpretation of expost budgetarydata,AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 31
TABLE 2-1
BUDGETARY POLICY DURING PERIODS OF
IMBALANCES OF PAYMENTS
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195732 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
should always be borne in mind.' Yet the weight of the evidence is
substantial:it indicates strongly that budgetary policy was not used
in the service of the target of balance-of-payments equilibrium.
While Table 2-1 is based on the indications about budgetary policy
provided only by the variable of the budgetary balance, similar infer-
ences would be reached if the government's revenues and expenditures
were examined separately. It must be concluded that budgetary policy
as an instrument of aggregate demand policy was not generally part
of the set of tools used to correct imbalances of payments. This would
not exclude the use of specific budgetary revenues or expenditures for
this purpose; while such use was not, as a rule, examined in this study,
there could be little doubt that a few such instruments were often
used in response to the needs of the balance of payments.
It was mostfrequently found that, in the countries under investiga-
tion, the failure to use budgetary policy for balance-of-payments pur-
poses cannot be explained by the assignment of this policy instrument
to the service of other competing targets. Most often, budgetary policy
seems to be excluded from the list of instruments available for the
correction of domestic as well as of balance-of-payments disequilibria.
One country for which this statement would definitely not be true is
Sweden, in which budgetary policy is geared, by and large, to the needs
of maintaining high employment and high production. To a large ex-
tent, this is also true for the United States. But in other countries, no
such overriding rule for the use of budgetary policy seems to emerge.
Even more rare is the use of the "policy mix," which came to be
heavily advocated in recent years, by which monetary policy is assigned
to the service of the balance of payments, while fiscal policy is re-
served for the achievement of the domestic targets of employment and
production.2 This policy combination would require a tight monetary
policy and an expansionary fiscal policy in periods of a balance-of-
payments deficit combined with high unemployment; and the reverse
order of policies with payments surpluses and domestic booms.
Table 2-2 presents the instances which qualify for such policy com-
bination (that is, in which opposite policy directions are called for by
1SeeChapter 1, pp. 19—20.
2Fortheoretical discussions of this "policy mix" see, for instance: Robert A.
Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal
and External Stability," I.M.F. Staff Papers, IX (March 1962), pp. 70—79; J.
Marcus Fleming, "Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating
Exchange Rates," l.M.F. Staff Papers, IX (November 1962), pp. 369—80; and
Anne 0. Krueger, "The Impact of Alternative Government Policies under
Varying Exchange Systems," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIX (May
1965),pp. 195—208.AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 33
TABLE 2-2
POLICIES DURING PERIODS OF CONFLICTING
REQUIREMENTS OF EXTERNAL AND
DOMESTIC POSITIONS
Monetary Country and Period Policy
Budgetary
Policy
EXTERNAL DEFICITS AND DOMESTIC SLACK
France, w 1952 —III1953 * mixed evidence
Germany, in 1951 —11952 * neutral
Netherlands, i 1956 —iii1957 + restrictive
U.K., ii 1951 —III1952 + restrictive
EXTERNAL SURPLUS AND DOMESTIC BOOM
Belgium, iv 1962 —iii1965 —restrictive
France, i 1950 —i1951 + expansionary
Germany, i 1963 —ii1964 * neutral
Italy, in 1953 —II1956 —restrictive
Italy, i 1961 —i1962 + expansionary
Sweden, i 1960 —III1962 * mixed evidence












+ indicates a policy in the direction required by the policy "mix."
—indicatesan opposite policy.
* indicates neutrality or conflicting evidence.
the country's domestic and external position). The presentation is
rather rough: only subperiods of imbalance of payments are observed,
without attempts of some other subdivisions; the indication of mone-
tary or budgetary policy as "restrictive" or "expansionary" involves
risks of oversimplification; and the total number of cases presented in
the table is rather small. But so far as the evidence of Table 2-2 goes,
it is rather clear. In only very few instances (one each in the U.K. and
in the Netherlands) does the "mix" under consideration appear to have
been undertaken.
2. Instruments of Monetary Policy
Monetary policy may be represented by numerous variables, each of
which could conceivably measure the direction of the policy pursued34 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
by the government. The discussion will turn now to the examination
of the variety of major monetary instruments which have been used in
the countries under consideration.
Chart 2-1 describes the observations concerning the use of monetary
instruments in individual countries. It covers, for each country, those
instruments which on the basis of prior information and the findings
of the present analysis are judged to have been used normally and
regularly, during at least a substantial part of the period, as tools of
over-all monetary policy. In each country, subperiods are shown ac-
cording to the balance-of-payments position. Whenever the instrument
under consideration is found to have behaved, during a given sub-
period, in a manner which conforms with balance-of-payments require-
ments, this period is colored black in the part of the chart which de-
scribes this instrument. When the instrument behaves in the opposite
way, the period is colored by diagonal lines; and when the instrument
shows no movement during an imbalance of payments, the period is
colored grey. Chart 2-2, which is added for reference, summarizes the
balance-of-payments positions in the individual countries: periods of
downward disturbances are colored by diagonal lines: periods of up-
ward disturbances, in white; and equilibrium periods, in grey.
The pattern described by chart 2-1 is illuminating. It is immediately
apparent that two variables alone may claim recognition as instruments
which have been often used in a manner consistent with balance-of-
payments requirements: the discount rate and the (rate of expansion
of) money supply. In Belgium, France, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom,3 at least one of these variables—usually
both—is seen to have moved in conformity with the balance-of-pay-
ments position either through the whole period or during most of it.
In the other three countries—and in the former six in other subperiods
—these variables seem to be generally "neutral," but not usually to
have moved in opposite direction to balance-of-payments requirements.
The variable of (the rate of expansion of) credit supply by com-
mercial banks shows a different pattern. In general, it reveals neither
widespread conformity with the balance-of-payments requirements, nor
the opposite, and may therefore be judged not to have been usually
assigned to balance-of-payments adjustment. In just two countries—
Belgium and the United Kingdom—does it seem probable that during
See, however, the discussion in the following section suggesting that in the
United Kingdom credit supply, and not money supply, as in other countries, mdi-
catés the direction of monetary policy.36 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CHART 2-2
THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION, 1950-66
Balance of payments surplus
Balance of payments deficit.
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certainparts of the period under consideration the variable of credit
supply wasinfact manipulated to serve the needs of the balance of
payments.
The next three variables, which represent central-bank lending, also
show different patterns. One of these, central-bank lending to the gov-
ernment, seems to indicate "indifference," that is, a mix of episodes of
movements which conform with balance-of-payments requirements,
opposite movements, and "neutral" reactions, in about equal propor-
tions. This is consistent with, and most probably related to, the find-
ings concerning the budgetary policy. The most common—although
not inevitable or universal—expression of a budgetary deficit would
be government borrowing from the central bank. A surplus on the
other hand would result in a repayment. Movements of the amount
of government borrowing from the central bank may thus be expected
to reflect, at least partly, movements of budgetary policy. Since the
latter have been found to be generally nonresponsive to the balance
of payments, it is not surprising to find no pattern of responsiveness
of central-bank lending to the gOvermnent.
The other component of central-bank lending—lending to commercial
banks—reveals on the other hand a very obvious pattern of behavior,
which is either neutral or (most often) runs counter to the direction
indicated by the balance-of-payments position. Cases in which this
lending declines with payments deficits and rises with payments sur-
pluses are quite rare; whereas the opposite pattern, rising lending at
times of deficit and declining lending with surpluses, is a very frequent
phenomenon. This is true for countries in which other variables con-AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 37
form to balance-of-payments requirements, as well as for those in
which no such positive response may be found.
The total domestic claims of a central bank consist overwhelmingly
of lending to commercial banks and to the government.4 Since lend-
ing to banks reveals a tendency to move in a direction opposite. to
balance-of-payments requirements, while lending to the government is
by and large "neutral," the combination of the two may also be ex-
pected to reveal a disadjusting pattern. This, indeed, it does, with only
slightly less consistency than does its component of lending to com-
mercial banks. This is true for practically all countries in which the
variable of the central bank's domestic claims is relevant and can be
reliably estimated.5
The remaining monetary variable shown in Chart 2-1—liquidity, or
reserve, ratios—is significant in only a small number of countries. In
two out of the three countries in which this variable was of any im-
portance, namely, Germany and the United States, a general indiffer-
ence of its movements to the balance of payments is apparent, while
the third—the Netherlands—even seems to show a pattern of behavior
opposite to that which the balance of payments would require.
3. Compliance of Monetary Policy with Balance-of-
Payments Requirements
It is thus seen that in a few countries none of the monetary instruments
show a pattern of compliance with the needs of the balance of pay-
ments. In other countries, a few of the instruments do reveal such a
pattern, and the most frequent policy combination is a change of the
discount rate coupled with a change in money supply. With a down-
In the United States, this total consists overwhelmingly of Federal Reserve
credit created by open-market operations. In other countries open-market oper-
ations are either absent or insignificant or, even when substantial, are viewed
as subsidary to the operation of one of the other monetary instruments.
From Chart 2-1, Japan seems to be a case in which movements of the
variable under consideration are as often in an adjusting direction as in the
opposite. As has been pointed out in the chapter on Japan, however, data on
Bank-of-Japan lending to the government are biased in the direction of con-
formity with balance-of-payments requirements (and are therefore not repre-
sented directly in Chart 2-1); this tends, naturally, to bias also the data on
total Bank-of-Japan domestic claims in the same direction.38 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
ward disturbance (that is, a balance-of-payments deficit) the discount
rate is raised, and the rate of expansion of money supply falls. With
balance-of-payments surpluses, the opposite movement takes place: the
discount rate is lowered, and the rate of expansion of money supply
rises.
If these two are considered the crucial variables of monetary policy
in the countries in which this pattern is observed, then this pattern im-
plies that the countries concerned manage their monetary policy so
that it conforms with the needs of the balance of payments; 6or,in
other words, that these countries follow "the rules of the game" of a
fixed-exchange-rate international monetary system. By most prevail-
ing monetary theories, one or the other of these two monetary vari-
ables (the discount rate—representing the whole scale of interest rates
—and the money supply), or both, would indeed be considered the
crucial variable. In a simple Keynesian model, monetary policy could
affect aggregate demand only to the extent that it affects the interest
rate—which, in turn, has its impact on the demand for investment. The
turn monetary policy is taking—that is, the question of whether its di-
rection of movement is restrictive or expansive—would then be judged
by the direction of movement of interest rates. The quantity theory of
money would, on the other hand, assign crucial importance to the
movement of money supply: aggregate demand is reduced by a reduc-
tion of the quantity of money, and raised by an increase of this quan-
tity. But interest rates, too, would be expected to move in a manner
consistent with movements of money supply: when the latter is low-
ered, interest rates must rise, hence the discount rate should be raised;
and, similarly, the discount rate should be lowered with an increase
of money supply.
In addition to its effect on the balance of payments through aggre-
gate domestic demand, a change in the discount rate would be expected
to affect the balance of payments through its impact on international
short-term (and possibly also longer-term) capital movements.
gardless of what analytical model is employed, the "rules of the game"
of balance-of-payments adjustment would thus require the discount
rate to be raised in times of balance-of-payments deficits and lowered
in times of surplus.
Themeaning given to "conformity" in this study, as stated in the preceding
chapter, should be reemphasized here.It indicates "conformity" in direction
alone, and not in size. Thus designating the monetary policy of a country as
"conforming" with the need for adjustment does not convey the idea that the
policy was necessarily sufficient, taken at the appropriate moment, or successful.AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 39
Neither of these two conventional monetary models would have re-
quired a definite movement in a specified direction of any of the
monetary variables other than the money supply and the discount rate.
Consider, for instance, the quantity theory (although the same conclu-
sions would follow from the Keynesian model). A reserve-losing coun-
try is expected to lower its aggregate demand, and this would be
done by a reduction of the money supply. But while the direction of
the required movement of money supply is thus indicated, the size
of this reduction is not. The more money supply changes, the faster
the adjustment process will be. But certainly no one would expect
this rule to require a rapid approach of the money supply to zero in
the reserve-losing country, or to infinity in the reserve-gaining country.
If a country were on the gold specie standard, the rate of change of
money supply would be specified by the system itself: if money supply
consists exclusively of gold, and so do the country's international re-
serves, the change in reserves and the change in money supply are one
and the same thing. It can by no means be argued, however, that,
if a country wants its monetary policy to serve the purpose of balance-
of-payments adjustment, this indeed is the proper size of the required
change in the quantity of money. The "proper" magnitude could be
larger than, smaller than, or, by chance, equal to the magnitude of the
automatic, direct fall in money supply which the loss of the country's
international reserves involves.
Suppose the required change in the money supply is smaller than the
automatic change. The monetary authority would then have to counter-
act—partly, not fully—this change by inducing an increase in com-
mercial-bank credittothe publicor by increasing central-bank
lending to the government. An increase in either of these two magni-
tudes while the country's balance of payments is in deficit is thus
not necessarily an indication of a lack of compliance with balance-of-
payments requirements. Taking the opposite case, suppose that the
required decline of money supply in the reserve-losing country ex-
ceeds the direct, automatic effect of the fall of reserves, and that com-
mercial-bank credit would thus have to fall to reinforce the direct
impact. The fall of international reserves involves a reduction of com-
mercial banks' reserves and hence of their lending capacity when no
excess reserves exist. This in itself would force the banks to reduce
credit. If this automatic credit decline exceeds the amount which the
monetary authority deems desirable, the lending capacity of banks will
have to be raised, rather than lowered further. This may be done by40 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
relaxing minimum-reserve requirements, or by increasing the banks'
reserves through the central bank's open-market purchases and its
lending to commercial banks and the government. This, of course, is
the case a fortiori when commercial-bank credit has to be raised rather
than lowered. The lowering of minimum-reserve ratios and an increase
in the central bank's domestic claims could thus well be consistent with
a monetary policy which complies with balance-of-payments require-
ments in a reserve-losing country. It should therefore be emphasized
that "compliance" in this sense does not necessarily indicate the use
of monetary instruments directly controlled by the monetary authority
in the "complying" direction: it may be entirely due to the automatic
effect of the change in the country's external assets not offset—at least
not fully offset—by policy actions.
In fact, as observed in the preceding section, the central bank's
domestic assets do show, in most countries, a clear tendency to move in
this way, that is, to rise with a fall in the country's external reserves,
and vice versa. This has also been noted, by Nurkse and by Bloom-
field, to be the case in earlier periods—although the tendencies revealed
in these earlier studies do not seem to be as clear-cut as they appear
here.7 As has been pointed out, the direction of movement of the cen-
tral bank's total domestic claims is governed, by and large, by that
part consisting of its claims on commercial banks. As a rule, it appears
that commercial banks are guided by a wish to prevent substantial
fluctuations (particularly reductions) in their credit to their clients. A
fall in the country's external reserves entails a similar loss of reserves
by the commercial banking system. Rather than diminish their lending,
the banks tend to replenish their reserves by availing themselves of
the other source of bank reserves—that is, by borrowing from the
central bank.8 Nurkse has paid much attention to this pattern of
behavior, which he termed "automatic neutralization." But the con-
clusions he drew from his observations were not warranted, due to an
unjustifiably strict interpretation of the "rules of the game" of balance-
Ragnar Nurkse, International Currency Experience (Montreal, 1944), Chap-
ter IV; and Arthur I. Bloomfield, Monetary Policy under the Gold Standard:
1880—1 914 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1959), Chapter V.
8Incases where commercial banks hold government securities which are
not considered as reserves or otherwise required to be held, the banks would
try to dispose of part of these securities. Normally, however, this would lead
the central bank to acquire these assets; that is,the domestic assets of the
central bank would rise to that exent that it would not be lending to the com-
mercial banking system but by an increase of claims on the government.AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 41
of-payments adjustment. Nurkse's interpretation judges monetary pol-
icy to be complying with the "rules" if the central bank's domestic
assets move parallel with its external assets, that is, with the country's
external reserves. The central bank would thus be required not only
to counteract the commercial banks' "automatic neutralization," but to
take even stronger measures in that direction (that is,leading to
parallel movements of the central bank's domestic and external re-
serves). As has just been argued, however, there is no need for such
parallel movements; changes in the centra.l bank's domestic assets in
a direction opposite to the change in the bank's (and the country's)
external assets could be perfectly consistent with an over-all pattern of
monetary policy geared to the requirements of balance-of-payments
adjustment.
In most instances, it may be recalled, a general pattern of respon-
siveness of monetary policy to the balance of payments is found to
involve movements of the discount rate and of money supply in an
adjusting direction—as a quantity theory of money would require from
such a pattern. There are, however, a few exceptions. Most notable is
the case of the United Kingdom. While the discount rate in the United
Kingdom rarely failed to respond to the needs of balance-of-payments
adjustment, no such consistency is shown by money supply. Until
the mid-1950's, changes in money supply did indeed conform to
changes in the balance of payments, but from 1956 onward this has
been rare. A higher degree of conformity with the country's external
situation is shown by commercial bank credit supply. This pattern is
consistent with what appears to be the prevailing opinion among mone-
tary analysts and policy makers in the United Kingdom, who would
mostly disavow the quantity theory of money while attributing heavy
weight to the availability, and perhaps the cost, of credit. In addition,
changes of the discount rate have naturally been considered particu-
larly important in the United Kingdom, as a reserve center, due to the
direct impact of interest-rate levels on short-term capital movements
and the (probably more impOrtant) indirect impact on movements of
speculative funds of increases in the discount rate, in times of deficit,
as a "declaration of faith" in the pound sterling's rate of exchange. For
the United Kingdom, therefore, commercial-bank credit (rather than
money supply) is taken here, along with the discount rate, as a guide
to the intention of the monetary authorities. It should be emphasized
that it is the intention, rather than the outcome, which is studied here.
Thus, by this yardstick, the United Kingdom is judged to have, as a42 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
rule, responded to the balance-of-payments position, despite the mostly
poor showing of the country's position—a performance which may
well be partly due to the particular selection of policy variables in the
United Kingdom.
Table 2-3, which is based on the findings of the studies of individual
countries, shows the pattern of monetary policy in the nine countries
covered in this study. Conformity of the pattern with the direction—
though not necessarily the magnitude—of movement indicated by bal-
ancé-of-payments requirements is represented by a plus sign, while a
minus is assigned when no such conformity appears. The table spec-
ifies the monetary variables by which the pattern has been judged and,
whenever there is a lack of agreement, gives the inferences for both
variables. Since a possible change in the pattern of behavior may be
found in a number of countries around the late 1950's or early 1960's,
the table distinguishes between two periods, the 1950's and the 1960's.°
On the evidence of Table 2-3, countries may be divided into three
groups. First come the United Kingdom and Japan, in which monetary
policy may be said to have complied consistently with the direction of
movement indicated by the balance-of-payments position of the. çoun-
try. This may also be true of Italy, though a judgment about that
country has to be based on rather meager evidence. For one thing, Italy
does not use changes in the discount rate as part of monetary policy,
and the evaluation of its policy is based here on money supply alone.
In addition, the small number of observations for Italy further reduces
the reliability of this evaluation.
Second, there are several continental countries—France, Belgium,
and the Netherlands—in which compliance with balance-of-payments
requirements exists, but is less consistent than in the United Kingdom
and Japan. Specifically, monetary: policy in these countries seems to
have become less responsive to the balance 61 payments during the
1960's. In Belgium and the Netherlands this change is recent, occurring
around 1962 or 1963. In France, it came as early as 1959, but is more
ambiguous: a change in policy is suggested by the discount rate vari-
able,10 while the behavior of money supply remains consistent with
changes in the balance-of-payments position in the more recent period
as well. For the period under study as a whole, but subject to qualifi-
The cut-off point between the two periods varies among the countries for
which this distinction is relevant, from about 1959 to 1962.
10Eventhe implication of the movement of interest rates in France becomes
less obvious when considered in conjunction with movements in other countries.
See the subsequent discussion in Section 5.AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 43
TABLE 2-3
RESPONSIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY
TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS











Italy Money supply + +
Japan Discount rate
Money supply + +
Netherlands Discount rate
Money supply J+









+ indicatesa policy in the direction required by the policy "mix."
—indicatesan opposite policy.
cation for recent years, these three countries appear to conform, in
their monetary policy, with the, needs of the balance of payments.
Lastly, in three other countries—the United States, Germany, and
Sweden—monetary policy appears to be consistently nonresponsive
to the needs of the balance-of-payments position. Isolated episodes of
compliance may, of course, be found, but not for any length of time.
4. Policy Responsiveness to Surpluses and Deficits
In discussions of policy patterns in the postwar world, two conflicting
claims have often been made. One argument leads to the conclusion that44 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
responses to balance-of-payments disequilibrium have a deflationary
bias. The argument goes as follows: the ability of countries to sustain
a balance-of-payments deficit for an appreciable period is limited by
the availability of external reserves, whereas no such restriction exists
when countries enjoy a balance-of-payments surplus and accumulate
external reserves. It is more likely, therefore, that a country incurring
balance-of-payments deficits would react by a restrictive policy than
that a country experiencing balance-of-payments surpluses would re-
spond by an expansionary policy. To put it differently, the reaction of
the same country to surpluses and to deficits is not symmetrical but
biased toward restriction.
The counter-argument claims a lack of symmetry in the opposite
direction. In the postwar world, it is argued, developed countries are
committed to a policy of full employment and, perhaps, of rapid
growth. Due to rigidities in the economy, policies restricting demand
must lead to unemployment and loss of production; hence, a strong
resistance must exist to the adjustment of balance-of-payments deficits
by such measures. No such resistance exists, on the other hand, to an
expansionary policy when surpluses are realized—and some expansion
in such circumstances is, of course, an automatic response. The over-
all tendency is hence expansionary or inflationary.
Table 2-4 is intended to provide a test of these claims. It describes
the responsiveness of monetary policy to instances of surpluses and
deficits in a shorthand manner, by singling out the exceptions to each
country's general policy pattern. For a country which has been classi-
fied in the last section as complying with balance-of-payments require-
ments, only instances of noncompliance of policy are presented; for a
noncomplying country, only instances of compliance are shown. Japan
does not appear in Table 2-4, for the simple reason that no episodes
of exception to the complying pattern of its monetary policy could be
found.
The evidence of Table 2-4 lends strong support to the claim that
countries tend to respond to deficits more than to surpluses. It is seen,
first, that almost all instances of responsiveness to balance-of-payments
requirements in countries in which such reaction was not the rule are
found in times of deficit—four such instances against a single case of
responsiveness at a time of surplus. Turning to the lower half of the
table, it is seen that the large majority of instances in which generally
complying countries have not responded in this manner occur in times
of surplus: only rarely—once in Belgium, and three times, for theAN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 45
TABLE2-4





COMPLIANCE WITH BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS REQUIREMENTS
IN NONCOMPLYING COUNTRIES
Germany II 1950 —i1951
II 1964 —I1966




Belgium iv 1955 —in1956HI 1952—II1953
i 1963 —III1965 -
France n 1952 —iv1952
i 1959 —iv1956
Italy iv 1953 —II1956





U.K. i 1950 —ii1951 iv 1956
x 1956 —m1956 iv 1958
i 1959 —rn1959 iv 1959
iv 1965 —
shortestduration, in the United Kingdom—did the policy pattern in
these countries appear to be unresponsive to balance-of-payments defi-
cits. The existence of a "deflationary," or "deficit-sensitive," bias of
monetary policy thus stands out clearly. This bias may be due to
either, or both, of two reasons. One, expounded earlier, is the asym-
metrical attitude of governments toward losses versus accumulations
of reserves. The other is the existence of the target of price stability,
which would lead to a reluctance to undertake an expansionary policy
during balance-of-paymentssurpluses, but would condonea restrictive
policy at times of deficit. The wish to avoid losses of external reserves
and, possibly, to avoid price increases, rather than to maintain full46 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
employment and fast growth, seems thus to be the stronger motivation
of monetary policy in the group of countries investigated in this study.
It should be remarked that this is definitely not the case with budget-
ary policy. It has been demonstrated earlier that budgetary policy was
in general unresponsive to the position of the balance of payments.
But even in the minority of instances (represented in column 1 of
Table 2-1) in which budgetary policy was consistent with balance-of-
payments requirements, oniy very few are periods of deficits. A hy-
pothesis that budgetary policy was used to adjust deficits may thus be
refuted even more emphatically than the more general hypotheses of the
application of budgetary policy for balance-of-payments adjustment.
5.RelativeTrends of National Monetary Policies:
Long-Term Movements
The analysis so far has relied mostly on inferences drawn from obser-
vations of policy responses to balance-of-payments fluctuations in each
country. It is possible, however, that the monetary authority, while
not reacting to the ups and downs of the country's external position,
may conduct a more restrictive monetary policy throughout the period
—if the general trend of the country shows a deficit—than it would
have otherwise. The verification of such. a possibility is by no means
easy. In the few instances in which longer-term developments are ana-
lyzed in the individual country studies in Part II, this has usually not
been very fruitful. It is possible, however, that cross-sectional, inter-
country comparisons may shed added light. Specifically, it may be in-
teresting to examine whether, in countries whose external reserves
tended to fall, monetary policy tended to be more restrictive than in
countries with generally favorable balance-of-payments positions.
Chart 2-3 traces discount-rate movements over the period of seven-
teen years by this study for each of the eight countries in which
this instrument was .used (in Italy, it should be recalled, the discount
rate was practically unchanged throughout). In general, an upward
trend in discount rates is apparent. The obvious exception is Japan,
in which the rate tended to fall. In that country, which experienced
during this period a very fast rate of growth, radical structural changes,
and a rapid capital accumulation, a substantial decline of real interest
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ward movement of the discount rate represents any trend of monetary
policy. For his reason, and also owing to the lack of information on
relevant discount rates in Japan prior to 1956, Japan will be excluded
from the following comparisons.
Given the general upward trend of discount rates, the relative move-
ment of each rate—relative, that is, to the movements of rates in
other countries—is probably more significant than the individual move-
ments taken separately. Table 2-5 shows changes in each rate, abso-
lutely and in relation to movements in the seven countries together,
during the period as a whole and during two equal subperiods: from
the beginning of the period to the late 1950's, and from then to the
end of the period.
The hypothesis under consideration would require a relative fall of
discount rates in countries with generally favorable external balances,
and vice versa. By and large, this seems to have happened. From the
beginning of the period to the end, the relative discount rate went up
considerably in the United Kingdom and in the United States, coun-
tries with unfavorable balance-of-payments developments.It went
down in Germany and France, reserve-accumulating countries, and
was about stable in Belgium and the Netherlands, whose balances were
on the whole favorable but less so than those of Germany or France.
Sweden, whose discount rate went up, had a favorable balance on the
whole, but not a very large one.
Observations of the two subperiods confirm the general impression.
But they also conform with the earlier inference of a generally more
complying monetary policy in the 1950's than in the 1960's: most of
the relative movements which were just described took place during
the earlier years. The separate observations of the two subperiods also
make the general impression more plausible. Thus, it is seen that the
decline of the rate in Germany took place during the 1950's, the period
of rapid accumulation of reserves in this country; in France, on the
other hand, it took place in the later years—again the period of reserve
accumulation. Likewise, the rise of the rate in Sweden appears to
have taken place during the 1950's—a period with only little reserve
accumulation in this country.
The conveyed by these comparisons is that monetary
policy may have been guided by the balance-of-payments position in
a few important instances in which the former analysis found it to be
unresponsive: the United States, Germany, and France since the late
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Long-term movements of the discount rate must reflect, at least in part,
developments which have bearing upon the real rate of interest—as in
Japan where it is obvious enough that such observations are to be
discarded altogether. Likewise, other policy movements which reflect
upon interest rates are excluded from consideration in such com-
parisons. It is very likely, for instance, that the upward trend of the
discount rate (and of other interest rates) in• the United States during
the 1960's is a result of the general trend of budgetary deficits during
these years—an effect which theory would lead one to expect; and these
budgetary deficits were certainly not meant to respond to the balance-
of-payments position. This may also be true (in the opposite direction)
in Germany during the early 1950's, where the decline of interest rates
accompanied a budgetary surplus. Germany is also another illustration
of a case where, like Japan, the real rate of interest might have been
expected to fall owing to a rapid accumulation of capital. These and
similar considerations would thus make conclusions based on longer-
term comparisons of discount rates at best very tentative.
These conclusions seem even more doubtful when contrasted with
comparisons of longer-term movements of money supply. The latter are
represented in Table 2-6 and in Chart 2-4. It has been noted earlier
that, when responsiveness to balance-of-payments fluctuations is found,
the variables of the discount rate and of money supply behave mostly
as parts of a consistent pattern. It might therefore, that
longer-term movements of these two variables may be similarly con-
sistent. In fact, however, this is not generally the rule. Excluding the
exceptional (Korean War) year of 1951, no trend seems to appear,
over the period as a whole, in the level of the rate of expansion of
money supply in the group of countries under study. In individual
countries, on the other hand, trends are sometimes found—and in a
way which usually contradicts the indications provided by trends of the
discount rates. Most conspicuous is the case of the United Kingdom:
the rate of expansion of money supply in that country shows an up-
ward trend, particularly in the 1960's—in clear contrast with the re-
strictive indication given by the upward movement of the discount rate.
This contrast is not surprising, in view of the dissimilarity of short-
term responsiveness of these two variables in the United Kingdom. But
the contrast is also found in movements of the two variables in France,
Belgium and the Netherlands, where consistency is mostly found in
reactions to balance-of-payments fluctuations. Thus, an even larger
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CHART 2-4
RATE OF CHANGE OF MONEY SUPPLY, 1951-66
Percent Percent
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tionof monetary policy, and the conformity of this direction with the
balance-of-payments position, which are drawn from longer-term in-
ternational comparisons.
6. Interrelationship of National Monetary Policies:
Short-Term Movements
While the longer-term international comparisons of monetary policies
do not prove to be very fruitful, short-term international observations
may add another dimension to the investigation. In the individual
country studies, the assumed target variables are all indicators of per-
formance of the national economy—its balance of payments, its em-
ployment, and the like. It may be worthwhile to study, in addition,
the possibility that policies may also be undertaken in response not to
these targets but to policies pursued by other countries. The examina-
tion of this possibility will be limited here to one policy variable—the
discount rate—and to the group of countries covered in this study—
more precisely, to just the seven countries of this group (Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) in which discount-rate variations are relevant for the
entire period.
If the discount rate in each country changed in response to fluctua-
tions in its balance of payments, and if balance-of-payments fluctua-
tions in the individual countries were positively correlated with each
other, movements of the discount rate would also be correlated. A
finding of comovements of discount rates could not be interpreted,
in such a case, as responsiveness of policy in each country to other
countries' policies. It is logically possible that changes in the balance
of payments of the seven countries could be positively correlated, since
the group constitutes only a part of the world. The share of this group
in total world trade is so large, however, that such a correlation (that
is, the group as a whole moving from a positive to a negative balance
in trade with the rest of the world, and vice versa) is not very likely.
A simple statistical test verifies, indeed, that the assumption of such
positive correlation must be rejected.1'
11 The test is as follows: Assume, as a null hypothesis, complete randomness in
the balance-of-payments position of individual countries. On the average, for the
seven countries under consideration during the sixty-eight quarters from the be-54 DEMANDPOLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
It is thus established that conformity of monetary policy withthe
direction indicated by the balance-of-payments position would not lead
to a general similarity in the direction of these policies in the respec-
tive countries. Yet such similarity is definitely evident. This may be
grasped from a casual observation of Chart 2-3. More convincing evi-
dence is provided by Table 2-7, which compares discount-rate move-
ments in individual countries with trends in the group as a whole. In
each country, each movement of the discount rate is contrasted with
the trend of discount rates in the other six countries during the quarter
in which the rate was changed and the preceding quarter. When there
ginning of 1950 to the end of 1966, the balance-of-payments position was positive
in 60 per cent of the quarters, and negative in the other 40 per cent (for the
purpose of this test, a period of stability is considered, in an alternating order,
as either a period of a positive or of a negative balance). The probability of any
given quarter having a positive balance, in any given country, is thus .6. With
this probability, and with the assumption of complete randomness (that is, com-
plete lack of dependence of a country's balance-of-payments position on other
countries' position), the observations of the sixty-eight quarters would be ex-
pected to be distributed as in column 2 in the table below:
Number of Number of Quarters
Positive Balances








6 9 1 .7
Total 68 68
The actual observations are recorded in column 3. A chi-square test shows (at
the .999 level of confidence) that the nul hypothesis (of complete randomness)
must be rejected. A look at the table reveals that the reason for this rejection is
the high concentration of actual observations at the point of the four positive
(against three negative) balances per quarter. That is, the observations con-
centrate at a position of an even division into positive and negative balances,
more than a complete randomness (or lack of dependence) would lead to ex-
pect. Thus, with a random distribution the average proportion of countries with
the same sign of balance-of-payments positions, as the majority of countries, in
each given quarter, would be expected to be 67.5 per cent; whereas the average
of this proportion among actual observations is only 62.0 percent. This con-
forms, of course, with the assumption that the country's positive balance is
likely to be at the expense of another country of the group under consideration,


































Belgium 14 2 6 76
France 8 1 4 77
Germany 13 3 7 72
Netherlands 16 3 3 80
Sweden 10 2 2 79
U.K. 18 2 3 85
U.S. 14 7 3 65
When the discount rate was changed more than once in a given quarter,
this is considered a single change.
aForthe calculation of this proportion, changes in periods with no trend are
taken as changes both in agreement with trend and opposing it, with half weights
assigned to each.
was a strong measure of agreement among the movements of rates
during these quarters, a "trend" (positive or negative) was determined
—with which the change in the country under consideration either
agreed or disagreçd; when no general agreement appears, or when
there were only very few rate changes during this period, the period is
judged to be without a trend.
It is immediately evident, from Table 2-7, that in all of the seven
countries under consideration movements of the discount rate in each
country were not independent of the movements of rates in the rest
of the group but, on the contrary, strongly related to it. This is least
true of the United States, where the link of rate movements with re-
spective movements in the outside world seems to be weakest (but
probably not entirely nonexistent). In all the rest of the countries the
link appears to be strong and obvious.56 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
It may be interesting also to examine in particular the relationship
of exceptions to the normal patterns of monetary policy in each coun-
try to discount-rate changes in the outside world. Table 2-4, it will be
recalled, records such exceptions: periods in which the monetary policy
in a usually noncomplying country appears to be consistent with the
needs of the balance of payments; or the policy in a country which
usually conforms moves in the direction opposite to balance-of-pay-
ments requirements. Table 2-4 shows twenty-four such episodes. Of
these, three are long enough to manifest more than a single trend of
development of the discount rates and are therefore excluded from
consideration. Of the remaining twenty-one episodes, in fifteen the direc-
tion of monetary policy was consistent with the trend of changes of
discount rates in the group of countries in which discount rates were
relevant. In three, the opposite was true; while in the remaining three
no trend was evident. It may be concluded that, in general, movements
of monetary policy which were exceptional to the normal pattern of
policy in the respective country conformed to the trend of policies in
the outside world, and could possibly be explained by the latter—
although the speculative nature of such an inference would be obvious.
It thus appears that the direction of policies undertaken in each indi-
vidual country is generally quite similar to the direction of policies
followed in other countries in the group under consideration (and, one
may presume, possibly also in other industrial countries which are not
covered in the present study), and that this could not be attributed to
chronological similarities in balance-of-payments developments. The
comovements of policies might conceivably be explained by chrono-
logical coincidence of movements of other targets. Specifically, if busi-
ness cycles happen to have similar chronological patterns in the
countries under consideration, comovements of policies should have
been expected. And if that were the case, changes in discount rates
relative to rates in other countries would have been a most meaningful
indication of a degree of responsiveness to the balance-of-payments
position. The examination of such coincidence is very difficult, partly,
at least, due to the lack of recognized business "cycles" in the analyses
of the countries involved, and to the conceptual difficulties inherent
in any attempt to determine such cycles. A rough comparison of
developments as charted by the variables of unemployment and indus-
trial production fails to uncover a chronological coincidence. It thus
seems quite unlikely that this could be the explanation of policy simi-
larities—although it must be emphasized that this statement is moreAN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 57
inthe nature of an impression than an inference drawn from a thorough
investigation.
Two other explanations of the comovements of monetary policies
may be offered. One is that policy makers are inclined by convention
to follow policies in other countries, and are likely to feel restrained in
undertaking opposite policies. The other explanation, which would
make such behavior rational, is concerned again with the balance of
payments. When discount rates (and interest rates in general) rise
elsewhere, a country which keeps its rate stable, and a fortiori one
which lowers its rate, is likely to experience outflows of short-term
capital, and a loss of reserves. Likewise, a country which raises its
rate while other rates fall is likely to experience an inflow of short-term
capital, which, due to its expansionary impact, the country may. find
unwelcome.
Insofar as this is the explanation, monetary policy is directed not at
the adjustment of actual imbalances of payments but at the prevention
of balance-of-payments movements expected to result from other coun-
tries' policies. This, of course, is a pattern of policies which does not
conform with the directives of balance-of-payments adjustment: the
latter would require two countries which undergo opposite experiences
in their balance of payments to undertake policies in opposite direc-
tions, rather than to coordinate their policies so that they will move
parallel with each other.
7. Policy Responsiveness and External Positions
Before bringing this over-all view of policy patterns to a close, it may
be worthwhile to inquire whether the existence or absence of policy
responsiveness to balance-of-payments disturbances could be explained
by structural differences among the external positions of the different
countries. A few specific aspects of this possiblity come to mind.
First, it may be assumed that the larger the role of a country's inter-
national transactions in relation to itstotal economic activity, the
greater the attention paid to its external position, and the more likely
that demand policy will respond to balance-of-payments fluátuations.12
12Itis not entirely certain that this assumption is valid. Compare two coun-
tries, one with large and the other with small imports relative to national in-
come, and assume a balance-of-payments deficit of the same proportion of im-58 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The size of the country's trade may be considered an important
factor in determining monetary developments also, insofar as these
developments are an automatic response. Specifically, it may be ex-
pected that a country with a large trade in relation to its stock of money
will realize automatically a large response of the variable of money
supply, in an adjusting direction, to balance-of-payments disturbances
of any given size (that is, of any given proportion of the country's
external transactions).
One other possible determinant of policy patterns, the direction of
whose influence seems quite obvious, is the size of a country's external
reserves. A country with large reserves may be able to refrain from
undertaking an adjusting demand policy in instances where such policy
might have been unavoidable without these reserves. This may almost
be said to be the raison d'être of holding reserves: to make it possible
to maintain a fixed exchange. rate without reacting in an adjusting man-
ner to downward imbalances of payments. If this is so, countries with
small reserves should be found to subject their monetary policy to the
needs of the balance of payments more than do. countries with large
reserves.
Table 2-8 provides figures for the ratios under consideration in each
of the nine countries. The size of trade in relation to the country's
economic activity is represented by the ratio of merchandise imports to
Gross National Product; while this is not the only possible (mean-
ingful) indicator, it is probably the best single measurement for the
purpose at hand.13 The size of imports in relation to the stock of
money is represented by the ratio of annual imports to the money
supply (at year-ends). Had the ratio of money to GNP been similar
ports in the two countries. If income elasticity of demand for imports is the
same in the two countries (abstracting, for simplicity, from consideration changes
in exports), the same percentage amount of reduction of national income would
correct the deficit in each country; on this basis, there seems to be no reason
to expect one country to be more reluctant than the other to undertake de-
mand policy in the adjusting direction. Moreover, automatic income effects would
be expected, under certain assumptions (such as the existence of positive and
equal propensities to save) to be more severe in the country with the larger im-
ports; that country may, therefore, feel less obliged to undertake a restrictive
monetary policy. Nevertheless,itis probably a general presumption that a
country whose trade is small is likely to attach smaller weight to the target
of balance-of-payments stability, and to try to achieve this stability, if it feels
compelled to do so, by other means than demand policy.
Takingexports rather than imports or an average of the two, would not
have changed the indication significantly. This statement is restricted, of course,
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everywhere, this measure would have been merely a repetition of the
ratio of imports to GNP; but the ratio of money to product is not
necessarily similar either in general or among the countries under
consideration. Finally, the size of reserve is represented by the ratio
of (end-of-year) reserves to (annual) imports. This, again, is only one
of the possible measures of size of reserves, and it may be expected to
give only a very rough idea. Yet, since the complex matter of indicators
of "adequacy" of reserves cannot be explored on this occasion, this is
probably the best single measure that could be adopted, and presum-
ably also the one most frequently observed by governments.
Table 2-9 summarizes in a descriptive way the indications provided
by Table 2-8. The countries are classified into two groups—"conform-
ing" and "nonconforming." Each respective measure is given a plus
sign if, by the indication it provides, the country should be expected
to adopt the policy pattern it has actually followed, a minus sign in the
opposite case, and an asterisk if the indication is neutral.
It appears, from Table 2-9, that the three relationships under con-
sideration could possibly explain some policy patterns, but not all or
even most. No striking difference seems to exist between the two
groups of countries in the relationships under study.
In observations of individual countries, the outcome appears again
to be, at best, mixed. All the three ratios under consideration could
explain the absence of responsiveness to the balance-of-payments posi-
tion in the United States. Almost as consistently they could explain the
high degree of compliance with balance-of-payments requirements in
the Low Countries—Belgium and the Netherlands. But Sweden, with
attributes similar to the two latter countries, is definitely a country
in which monetary policy does not respond to the balance-of-payments
position. Similarly, Japan would not be expected, by the evidence of
these indicators, to follow the responsive monetary policy which it
has devotedly followed; whereas the indication provided for France,
the United Kingdom and Germany is unclear. Observations of these
indicators, of what might be regarded as the structural position of a
country's external transactions in its over-all economy, thus offer little
explanation of the differences among countries.
Finally, it might be assumed that a "reserve-currency" country could
be more inclined to subject its monetary policy to the needs of the
balance of payments than one which does not fulfill this role. Since
only two countries qualify for this category—the United States and the
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this factor may be attempted. The two countries involved pursued, of
course, almost diametrically opposite policy patterns.
8. Summary and Conclusions
The following summary of policy patterns in the postwar world will
outline the main conclusions that have emerged from the present chap-
ter; in addition, it will include a larger amount of speculation than
there is in the main body of the analysis.
According to their patterns of responsiveness of monetary policy to
the balance-of-payments position, the nine countries investigated in this
study may be divided into three groups:
a. In two countries—the United Kingdom and Japan—mone-
tary policy appears to have been played consistently according to
the classical "rules of the game"; that is, to have been guided by
the fluctuations in the country's external position.
b. In four other countries—France, Belgium, the Netherlands
and, probably, Italy—monetary policy seems again to have been
directed by balance-of-payments movements much of the time,
but not with the same consistency as in the two former countries.
c. In the three remaining countries—the United States, Ger-
many, and Sweden—monetary policy does not appear to have
been generally, or even mostly, responsive to the balance of pay-
ments, and thus did not comply with the "rules of the game."
In countries of the first two groups in which compliance of monetary
policy with the directives of the balance of payments tended to be the
rule, the monetary tools which have been used for the purpose appear
to be primarily the traditional instruments, namely the discount rate
and the supply of money; the most important exception is the United
Kingdom, where money supply is largely disregarded and credit supply
takes its place as a major instrument of monetary policy.
Budgetary policy, on which attention has been so largely focused in
theoretical discussions since the 1930's, appears to have responded to
the balance-of-payments position only infrequently, definitely not as
a rule, although this conclusion must be more heavily guarded than
most others, due to the limitations of observations of this variable. It
does not appear, moreover, that the failure to use budgetary policy for
balance-of-payments adjustment stems from the use of this instrumentAN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 63
in the service of domestic targets, whose requirements may contradict
tho.se of the target of balance-of-payments equilibrium. It seems more
probable that, despite the heavy emphasis on it in analytical discussions
or even in statements of policy makers, fiscal policy is largely unrespon-
sive to the needs of major. policy targets—either because itis too
inflexible or because the principle of a balanced budget is still adhered
to quite closely by policy makers.
It should be noted, in this connection, that the frequency of conflicts
between the requirements of domestic targets—mainly the target of
high employment—and the requirements of balance-of-payments equi-
librium is not as high as the attention paid to these clashes in recent
discussions would suggest. The impression that such a contradiction
is of an overriding concern is probably due in large part to the recent
experience of the United States, where from the late 1950's to the mid-
19 60's a high rate of unemployment accompanied a persistent balance-
of-payments deficit. But this experience is by no means commonly
shared: in most other major countries, the requirements of external
and internal balance tended much more often to provide policy indica-
tions in the same direction, or at least not to contradict each other,
rather than to point in opposite directions. As a result of this, and of
the general lack of enthusiasm to employ budgetary policy, the use of
the much discussed "policy mix," which would assign monetary policy
to balance-of-payments adjustment and fiscal policy to the achievement
of high employment (where the two targets call for policies in opposite
directions), is a rarity rather than a common phenomenon.
Countries whose monetary policy generally responds to changes in
the balance of payments tend to make exceptions to this pattern of
behavior mainly when they are in surplus. Similarly, compliance of
monetary policy with balance-of-payments requirements in generally
noncomplying countries tends to. be found at times of deficits. It thus
appears that makers of monetary policy tend to gear their conduct to
the country's external position more at tinies of deficits than at times
of surpluses. It also appears that this tendency is not necessarily related
to the level of external reserves:it is found when reserves are high
as well as when they are low. It seems that countries tend to regard
as their external target not so much the attainment of balance-of-
payments equilibrium as the avoidance of deficits. The external target
appears, that is, to be defined in a one-way manner. The loss of reserves
is viewed with concern; but their accumulation—which might have
been considered to be just as undesirable, due to its interference with
the operation of the international system and to the real loss to the64 DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
economy of holding reserves—is viewed, in fact, with satisfaction or
indifference.
Aside from this disparity in reactions to external surpluses and
deficits, differences among countries in their responses to the balance-
of-payments position do not seem to be accounted for by any single
factor in their structural positions or international experiences. The
importance of external trade could explain the greater responsiveness
in Belgium and the Netherlands than in the United States. Low external
reserves may explain the tendency in the United Kingdom and, during
part of the period, in France, to comply with balance-of-payments
requirements; whereas high reserves could explain opposite patterns
in the United States and in Germany; and a large automatic impact of
balance-of-payments developments on money supply could explain,
again, responsiveness in the Low Countries and in France, and its
absence may account for the lack of responsiveness in the United
States. But almost all these assertions must remain within the realm
of possibilities, at best partly verified, rather than strongly supported
inferences, since statements to the contrary could not, by and large,
be entirely rejected on the basis of the evidence on hand.
There could be little doubt, moreover, that these factors do not
nearly exhaust the list of possibly significant influences. Policy patterns
are determined by general inclinations of policy makers, which eventu-
ally reflect the basic attitude of the public. The factors which have been
investigated do, it may be presumed, play some role; but a much wider
range of structural conditions and historical experiences takes place
in shaping general attitudes: histories of depressions or of rapid infla-
tions would, of course, be most obvious examples.
The fact that the majority of the nine countries under investigation
appear to have conducted, during most of the time, their monetary
policy in a manner which complies with the "rules of the game," should
be interpreted with caution when implications for the international
monetary system as a whole are drawn. It should be recalled, first, that
the noncomplying group includes the United States and Germany—
two of the most important countries in the system. Second, it should
be noticed that the tendency of monetary policy to be guided by
balance-of-payments requirements appears to have weakened during
the 1960's: in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, responsiveness
of monetary policy to the balance of payments is absent or less frequent
in this period in comparison with the 1950's, while no examples of an
opposite shift are found among the other countries studied.AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POLICY PATTERNS 65
In view of the starting position in the world at that time, it would
seem that policy patterns during the 1950's may have been consistent
with the requirement of stability in the international monetary system.
In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the distribution of international
liquidity among the major countries was grossly uneven. Considera-
tions of the level of external reserves in different countries could have
justified a failure to react to developments which tended to equalize
the distribution. Specifically, in view of the very high level of reserves
with which the United States started this period, and the rather low
level of reserves in Germany, the lack of response in the former to the
loss of reserves, and in the latter to their accumulation, must have
contributed to the stability of the international system.
From the late 1950's onward, on the other hand, policy patterns
appear in a different light. While in earlier years the distribution of
reserves had been moving toward greater equality, the tendency during
the later period has been toward lesser equality. The failure to respond
by adjustment policies to losses of reserves in the United States, and
to their accumulation in Germany and, during most of the period, in
France, now definitely ran counter to the requirement for a stable
international system. Furthermore, the general level of reserves (when
measured, by the conventional yardstick, as a proportion of the flow
of external transactions) was lower in the later period—a fact which
would have called for a stronger policy response to balance-of-pay-
ments fluctuations. Moreover, the 1960's have been characterized by
practically full external convertibility, and considerable freedom of
capital movements among the major countries. That is, instruments of
control of external transactions, which could be (and most probably
were) used in place of adjustments in demand policy in the earlier
years, have been mostly foregone in the later period. It thus appears
that, in contrast with the 1950's, patterns of demand policy in the
1960's cannot be judged to have been consistent with the target of
stability of the international monetary system.
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